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The characteristics of tenure systems are thought to be an
important mediating factor in pursuing development objec-
tives focused on enhancing livelihoods and achieving sustain-
able environmental outcomes (Deininger, 2003; DFID, 2007;
FAO, 2002; SIDA, 2007; Sunderlin et al., 2005). 1 Among oth-
ers, critical questions dominating the policy dialog on forests
and tenure include questions of who should own forests, the
inﬂuence of overlapping claims to forests, and the articulation,
monitoring, and enforcement of property rights. Examples of
contemporary tenure-related policy issues include: the devolu-
tion of property rights from centralized governments to com-
munities and private entities (RRI, 2012; RRI/ITTO, 2009;
Sunderlin, Hatcher, & Liddle, 2008); the decentralization of
forest management to local governments (Jagger, 2010; Lar-
son, 2005; Larson, Pacheco, Toni, & Vallejo, 2007; Ribot,
2004); 2 movements to formalize property rights throughout
the developing world (Meinzen-Dick & Mwangi, 2008); and
the emphasis of a wide range of stakeholders on the need to
clarify rights to land, trees, and carbon in processes of devel-
oping and implementing reduced emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation (REDD+) policies and projectsS43(Sunderlin et al., 2013; Corbera, Estrada, May, Navarro, &
Pacheco, 2011; Larson, Corbera, et al., 2010).
The focus of much of the research on forests and tenure is on
the relationship between forest tenure and resource sustainabil-
ity (Bowler, Buyung-Ali, Healey, Jones, Knight, & Pullin, 2012;
Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008; Gibson, Ostrom, & Williams, 2005;
Sayer,McNeely,Maginnis, Boedhihartono, Shepard, & Fisher,
2008). But there are considerable gaps in our understanding of
how characteristics of forest tenure inﬂuence the ability of rural
households to obtain income from forests. This paper uses data
from theCenter for International ForestryResearch’s (CIFOR)
Poverty Environment Network (PEN) to test hypotheses about
the inﬂuence of tenure characteristics on the amount and type of
income that rural households obtain from forests. Speciﬁcally
we explore the role of forest ownership (i.e., state, community,
or private), the eﬀect of varying levels of enforcement of rules,
S44 WORLD DEVELOPMENTand the degree of overlap between use by formal owners and
other resource users (i.e., congruence) on forest incomes real-
ized by rural households. Our analysis draws on a large and het-
erogeneous sample including data from 271 villages and over
6,000 rural households. The sample includes study sites in 20
countries in the three major tropical regions of Asia, Latin
America, and Africa. We contribute to the limited literature
on forest income and tenure, and place our ﬁndings in the
broader discussion of the potential trade-oﬀs and synergies be-
tween welfare and sustainable forest management outcomes.
Our study is motivated by the desire to understand the role of
forest tenure variables that can be inﬂuenced by national-level
public policy interventions including, but not limited to, devolu-
tion of forest ownership, clariﬁcation of property rights, clariﬁ-
cation of tenure systems with overlapping claims, and increased
enforcement of rules.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES,
DATA, AND APPROACH
(a) Research questions and hypotheses
The central topic of this study is how tenure characteristics
inﬂuence the amount of income that rural households obtain
from forests. Our study focuses on three fundamental aspects
of forest tenure: formal ownership; level of enforcement of rules;
and congruence, or the extent of overlap in use rights, between
forest owners and the actual users of the resource. 3Accordingly
our analysis is centered on three research questions:
i. What forest ownership categories (i.e., state, community,
or private) do rural households obtain forest income from?
ii. How does the degree of enforcement of rules at the vil-
lage-level (i.e., none, moderate or high) inﬂuence the
amount of forest income obtained by rural households?
iii. How does the extent of overlap between use by formal
forest owners and actual forest users (i.e., congruence
parsed as none, partial or full) at the village-level inﬂuence
the amount of forest income obtained by rural households?
We deﬁne ownership as the de jure or legal holding of prop-
erty rights to the forest, including rights of access, withdrawal,
management, exclusion, and alienation (Schlager & Ostrom,
1992). Following previous studies of forest tenure (i.e., RRI,
2012; RRI/ITTO, 2009; Sunderlin et al., 2008) we use the for-
mal ownership categories of state, community, and privately
owned forests. 4 Many studies on forest tenure in developing
countries have focused on the relationship between forest
ownership and sustainability, and generally ﬁnd an ambiguous
relationship (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003; Ostrom & Nagen-
dra, 2006). Other literature looks at the relative eﬀectiveness of
diﬀerent types of forest ownership to understand which own-
ership categories lead to lower rates of deforestation and deg-
radation (e.g., Bowler et al., 2012; Porter-Bolland, Ellis,
Guariguata, Ruiz-Mallen, Negrete-Yankelevich, & Reyes-
Garcia, 2012; Andam, Ferraro, Pfaﬀ, Sanchez-Azofeifa, &
Robalino, 2008; Nepstad et al., 2006). In this study, our focus
is on tenure and forest income, though our results do suggest
some implications for sustainable forest management.
Most studies examining the relationship between forest ten-
ure and forest income focus on a speciﬁc ownership category
or on single case studies (Adhikari, 2005; Chhetri, 2010). Some
exceptions are Ferraro andHanauer (2011) andAndam, Ferraro,
Sims, Healy, and Holland (2010) who compare protected
areas and reserves (e.g., state-owned lands) with ungazzeted
areas in Costa Rica and Thailand, and Jagger, Pender, and
Gebremedhin (2005) and Jagger and Luckert (2008) whocompare household incomes from community and privately
owned small-scale woodlots in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe respec-
tively. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to investigate
relationships between tenure characteristics and forest income
with a global dataset. We have no speciﬁc hypotheses regarding
the types of formal forest ownership categories that rural
households use most for forest income. These relationships are
largely the result of historical settlement and land use patterns
that are diﬃcult to identify with cross-sectional behavioral data.
We deﬁne enforcement as the degree to which sanctions are
applied in the event that rules are not followed. Several recent
studies ﬁnd that enforcement, and more speciﬁcally engage-
ment of local resource users in enforcement, contributes to
sustainable forest management and biodiversity conservation
(Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008; Gibson et al., 2005; Persha, Agra-
wal, & Chhatre, 2011). These studies are largely based on ﬁnd-
ings from community forests and, with the exception of Persha
et al. (2011), are squarely focused on biophysical outcomes.
Enforcement is hypothesized to be an important variable with
respect to forest income as forests yield multiple beneﬁts and
products, and have multiple stakeholders with competing
claims. We hypothesize that high levels of enforcement on
state-owned forests will be associated with lower forest in-
comes. High enforcement in such settings implies that local
forest users are being closely monitored and that use of forest
resources may be limited or forbidden. Conversely, we hypoth-
esize that high levels of enforcement will be associated with
higher forest incomes for community- and privately owned
forests. Findings from studies of community forests suggest
that in the absence of enforcement of rules against those
who would extract excess beneﬁts (e.g., illegal harvesting), for-
est sustainability and the maintenance of forest-based liveli-
hoods can be jeopardized (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008).
However, over the short term, an absence of rule enforcement
can yield higher beneﬁts for households that are not con-
strained in their forest collection activities. Therefore, there
may be some situations where no or low enforcement may
be associated with high forest incomes.
Congruence is the extent of overlap in use between the de
jure formal owners and the de facto or actual users of the
forest. The inﬂuence of this aspect of tenure has not been well
explored empirically in the literature, though we note that sev-
eral scholars have explored the connection between the well-
being of rural households and contestation of ownership rights
between the state and local users (RRI, 2012; Larson, Barry,
Dahal, & Colfer, 2010; Ellsworth, 2004; Ellsworth & White,
2004; Larson et al., 2007). We hypothesize that for state-
owned forests a higher degree of congruence is associated with
lower forest incomes for rural households. States with a vested
interest in extracting resources from a particular forest may be
less likely to allow other users to harvest products. Conversely,
we hypothesize that for community- and privately owned for-
ests, partial or full congruence between formal owners and ac-
tual users will be associated with higher forest incomes, as
those holding the property rights are the local users. This
hypothesis follows from ﬁndings from the community forestry
literature suggesting that a high degree of engagement of local
resource users in rule making and management decisions,
including rules of use, may increase the likelihood of sustain-
able forest management and favorable rural livelihoods out-
comes (McKean, 2000; Persha et al., 2011).
(b) Key variables and deﬁnitions
Central to this study is the collection of data characterizing
forest tenure. A broad tenure classiﬁcation system suitable for
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was developed by a multi-disciplinary group of researchers
that included anthropologists, economists, political scientists,
and sociologists. Discussions among scholars in these disci-
plines resulted in three central questions: (1) Who are the for-
mal (de jure) owners of the forest?; (2) Who are the actual (de
facto) forest users?; and (3); If they exist, how well are rules of
access, use, and management enforced? While it is not easy to
classify diverse forest tenure systems with a parsimonious set
of variables, we developed a three digit coding system which
captures the possible combinations of three key dimensions
of tenure: ownership; formal and informal use rights; and level
of enforcement of rules. The system was used in village surveys
to code tenure characteristics of forests accessed by village
members, and in household surveys to describe the character-
istics of forests where products were collected. The coding sys-
tem is comprised of three levels as follows (CIFOR, 2007):
1. The ﬁrst level represents the formal or legal (de jure)
owner of the land, which is the entity with the transfer
rights (rights to sell, lease or rent out the land), and can
be: (1) the state (nationally or regionally); (2) communities
(i.e., collective); (3) private (individuals or companies);
2. The second level represents the actual or de facto forest
users, (who normally have no de facto or de jure transfer
rights). One problem can be overlapping use rights on the
same piece of land, e.g., individual agricultural rights com-
bined with collective rights to collect fuel wood or wild
fruits. Hence, we introduced mixed categories for de facto
overlapping land rights, thus yielding seven categories:
(1) state, (2) community, (3) private, (4) state–community,
(5) state–private, (6) community–private, and (7) state–
community–private. 5
3. The third level indicates the degree of enforcement of
rules, which regulates access of users, permissible uses,
and possibly also the management of the land and its
resources. Three categories are distinguished: (1) high, (2)
moderate, and (3) no enforcement of rules. Note that the
rules might be set by the de facto and/or the de jure owners,
and may have the backing by either the state or customary
institutions.
For example, code 122 is a state-owned forest, used/man-
aged by the community, with a moderately low degree of rule
enforcement. It could be a sustainable-use protected area in
Brazil, such as an extractive reserve, or an agro-extractive
community in Bolivia. A forest assigned code 221 is a commu-
nity-owned and -managed forest with no rule enforcement,
e.g., a community in Democratic Republic of Congo with
the inability to exclude timber companies. The joint forest
management program in India would have the code 142: the
state is the oﬃcial owner of the forest, but shares use rights
with communities, and is managed with moderate enforcement
of rules.
Employing a parsimonious classiﬁcation system to describe
forest tenures across a heterogeneous set of study sites is chal-
lenging. The PEN project undertook several measures to en-
sure data quality including: comprehensive training of PEN
research partners on the tenure coding system; the provision
of detailed technical guidelines to clarify the tenure classiﬁca-
tion system for use in training enumerators and for trouble
shooting in the ﬁeld; and training on how to conduct an eﬀec-
tive focus group, which is how the majority of the village-level
survey questions were answered.
The broader structure of the PEN dataset has been
described in detail in Angelsen et al. (2014). In addition to
village-level data that characterize the forest tenure types in
the study villages, we use village-level data that indicate thesize of forests, the extent of forest-centered collective action,
(i.e., number of forest user groups), group heterogeneity
(i.e., the number of ethnic groups in the village); and group
size (i.e., the population of the village). Geographic Informa-
tion Systems (GIS) data are used to characterize dominant
ecosystem, forest cover, deforestation/degradation trends be-
tween 2006 and 2009, the time frame during which most of
the PEN data were collected, market access, and population
density for the villages in the PEN sample.
The dependent variables in our analysis are variants of for-
est income (total, subsistence and cash). For all three types, we
deﬁne forest income as the gross value (quantity produced
multiplied by price) minus the costs of purchased inputs
(e.g., transportation and marketing costs, and hired labor). 6
The PEN guidelines (CIFOR, 2007) stress the importance of
collecting data on households’ extraction and production of
forest products used for both subsistence and generating cash
income. Forest income data were collected for each household
on a quarterly basis using a detailed household income ques-
tionnaire. 7 Data were collected with a recall period of one
month and multiplied by three to estimate the value for each
quarter. Quarterly data were then aggregated and adjusted
for adult equivalent units to provide annual per adult equiva-
lent estimates for each household. Data across study countries
were adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) and normal-
ized to USD. Household-level data were then averaged for
each village in our study to provide an estimate of the mean
annual household total, subsistence, and cash forest income
by tenure type for each village in the sample.
(c) Sample and representativeness
Country and site selection for the PEN project was purpo-
sive based upon a desire to cover all major forest regions
across the tropics, and by the interests of selected research
partners. Village selection included a variety of methods
depending upon the research design of the PEN partner. Sam-
pling methods range from national or regional random or
stratiﬁed random samples of villages, to purposive sampling
on the basis of site-level characteristics important to the indi-
vidual PEN study. Households were randomly selected from
village-level rosters. The average number of households sam-
pled within a PEN village is 24.
Data on tenure for forests 8 accessed by households in the
PEN sample are available for a subset of the total PEN sam-
ple. Of the 620 forests documented in the PEN dataset, we
have a complete set of data for 487 forests in 271 villages. 9
Complete data include information on: tenure (i.e., formal
ownership, enforcement, and congruence), forest size (i.e., esti-
mated area in hectares), and the GIS data used for character-
izing forest conditions, market access, and population
density. 10 Missing data on the size of forests were by far the
most signiﬁcant limiting factor for our sample. In order to ad-
dress potential bias in our sub-sample of PEN villages relative
to the full PEN sample we provided a number of robustness
checks which are elaborated in the following section.
We consider the representativeness of the PEN study sites
by comparing the distribution of forests by formal or de jure
owner identiﬁed in Sunderlin et al. (2008) and RRI/ITTO
(2009) with the distribution of forest ownership in the villages
included in the PEN sample (Table 1). 11 We note that the
Sunderlin et al. (2008) and RRI/ITTO (2009) data (hereafter
RRI) are not globally representative, but rather provide an
overview of forest ownership in the most forested countries
in each of the three major tropical regions using available sec-
ondary data. The PEN and RRI data are closely aligned with
Table 1. Representativeness of PEN tenure data, share of forest by formal ownership category1,2
Number of villages (PEN) State Community Private
RRI PEN RRI PEN RRI PEN
Asia3 56 68.0 68.9 28.0 2.8 4.0 28.2
Latin America4 68 36.0 60.9 32.0 24.9 32.0 14.1
Africa5 147 97.9 72.7 2.0 11.7 0.1 15.5
All 271 65.0 69.0 22.0 13.2 13.0 17.8
1Area data missing for 63 villages in PEN sample.
2RRI data are drawn from Sunderlin et al. (2008) and RRI and IITO (2009).
3 Includes PEN sites in Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.
4 Includes PEN sites in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Guatemala.
5 Includes PEN sites in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda,
and Zambia.
S46 WORLD DEVELOPMENTrespect to the share of forest owned by the state overall (69%
and 65% respectively), and for state-owned forests in Asia
(69% and 68% respectively). Relative to the RRI data, PEN
has a smaller share of state-owned forests in the Africa region,
and a larger share of state-owned forests in Latin America. We
ﬁnd considerable diﬀerences between the distribution of forest
ownership in the RRI and PEN samples for community- and
privately owned forests. Overall the PEN dataset has a smaller
share of community forest than the RRI dataset (13% and
22% respectively), with very large diﬀerences in the Asia re-
gion. Relative to the RRI data, the PEN dataset has a larger
share of private forests (18% vs. 13% for RRI), with large dif-
ferences in all three regions, but particularly in Asia. The over-
all representativeness of the PEN study sites is addressed in
more detail in Angelsen et al. (2014).
(d) Analytical approach
Methods of analysis include: factor analysis to identify for-
est domains; descriptive statistics to identify general patterns
of forest tenure classiﬁcations and forest income in the PEN
study areas; and econometric analysis to investigate the rela-
tionship between enforcement of rules, congruence, and forest
income. Our empirical model is based on the general speciﬁca-
tion:
FY ji ¼ f Eji ;C ji ;CTji
 
where:
FY ji = annual total, subsistence or cash forest income per
adult equivalent, averaged across each household in village
i (i = 1, . . ., 271 villages), for a given forest ownership type j
(j = 1, 3 forest ownership types);
Eji = a vector of 2 enforcement of rules variables (c.f.
none); =1 if moderate, =0 otherwise; =1 if high enforce-
ment, =0 otherwise;
C ji = a vector of 2 congruence variables (c.f. none); =1 if
partial congruence, =0 otherwise; =1 if full congruence = 0
otherwise;
CTji = a vector of control variables that includes:Forest area (in hectares);
Number of forest user groups in the village;
Number of people in the village;
Number of ethnic groups in the village
Forest Domain Factor Score (factors 1–5) (see deﬁnition
below)
Presence of other forest ownership category (3 catego-
ries, c.f. state) = 1 if community, =0
otherwise; =1 if private, =0 otherwise OR(3 categories, c.f. community) =1 if state, =0 otherwise;
=1 if private, =0 otherwise OR
(3 categories, c.f. private) =1 if state, =0 otherwise; =1 if
community, =0 otherwise
Regions (3 regions, c.f. Asia) =1 if Latin America, =0
otherwise; =1 if Africa, =0 otherwise.
We estimate a series of village-level ordinary least squares
regression models to test hypotheses about the relationship be-
tween forest income and enforcement of rules and congruence
for each ownership type. We parse our analysis by formal
owner because we believe that there are systematic diﬀerences
in state-, community-, and privately owned forests with re-
spect to size, quality, and other factors. 12 Our regression
models for each formal forest ownership category are further
decomposed by the type of forest income: subsistence, cash,
or total. We did no not use forest incomes per hectare as
our dependent variable due to the challenges of obtaining reli-
able estimates of forest size, particularly in cases where the for-
est is very large, and due to the very wide and non-normal
distribution of forest size, particularly for state forests. Our
independent variables include the level of enforcement of
property rights, and the extent of congruence between owners
and users of the forest. We control for a number of variables
known to inﬂuence forest income including forest size, pres-
ence of village level collective action, village population, and
ethnic heterogeneity (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2008; Persha
et al., 2011).
We control for exogenous forest characteristics using the
factor scores generated by our factor analysis (described be-
low) and regional dummy variables. In our models we also in-
clude dummy variables that reﬂect whether other ownership
categories of forests are present in the village. Due to limited
degrees of freedom particularly for our models for commu-
nity- and privately owned forests we use a relatively parsimo-
nious model speciﬁcation. We recognize the potential for
endogeneity in our model because, for example, the level of
enforcement could inﬂuence forest income (as per our model
structure), and forest income could inﬂuence the level of
enforcement. In the same way, the values that can be extracted
from a forest may inﬂuence the institutional and ownership
arrangements that come to dominate that forest. Therefore,
we interpret the results that follow as associations rather than
strict causal relationships.To address the issues of potential
bias in our sub-sample of villages relative to the full PEN sam-
ple we undertook a number of robustness checks. First we rep-
licated the principal components factor analysis using the
complete set of GIS data. 13 We ﬁnd that most of the factor
scores and by extension our characterization of forest domains
are robust (Table 2). We also run our full set of regression
Table 2. Identiﬁcation of forest domains (factor analysis results)1,2,3
Variable Rotated factor loadings
Interpretation of factor 1 2 3 4 5
High quality
moist broadleaf
forest in
remote regions
Dry broadleaf
forest in
populated
regions
Low quality
forest in
populated
regions
Montane
grassland in
populated
regions
Coniferous
forest in
populated
regions
Forest cover in 2006 (%) 0.667R 0.471 0.006 0.272 0.069
Annual rate of deforestation between 2006 and 2009 (%) 0.044 0.086 0.797R 0.013 0.002
Annual rate of degradation between 2006 and 2009 (%) 0.132 0.154 0.681R 0.079 0.092
Dominant ecosystem (c.f. desert and shrubland)
Montane grassland 0.011 0.065 0.020 0.979R 0.040
Tropical and subtropical coniferous 0.013 0.040 0.020 0.038 0.988R
Tropical and subtropical dry broadleaf 0.012 0.950R 0.014 0.117 0.065
Tropical and subtropical grasslands/savannah 0.862 0.339 0.005 0.281 0.152
Tropical and subtropical moist broadleaf 0.802R 0.308 0.051 0.211 0.176
Population density 0.479 0.488R 0.371R 0.282R 0.272R
Distance to nearest road (km) 0.506R 0.078 0.369 0.158 0.110
1 Principal components factor method used. Factors rotated using varimax method. The ﬁve retained factors account for 77.4% of the variance, and
represent factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.09.
2Unit of analysis is the village (N = 271). Included in this analysis are all villages with forest tenure data and area data available.
3 Factor scores are robust (R) when compared with PEN sample of 308 villages with remote sensing, GIS and forest tenure data available. Remote sensing
and GIS data were missing for six villages in China and seven villages in Nepal. Thirteen villages in one of the Brazilian sites had missing forest tenure
data.
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forest size, thereby allowing us to include a larger portion of
sampled forests. We do not present these results, because they
are similar to the models presented, but in Table 5 have only
noted ﬁndings which are robust (i.e., same sign and signiﬁcant
at least at the 10% level) to the alternative speciﬁcation. All
models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered
at the site level, 14 have been tested for multicollinearity using
the variance inﬂation factor test, and heteroskedasticity using
the Breusch-Pagan test.3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
(a) Forest domains
The diversity of ecosystems, forest conditions, population
density and market access in the villages included in the
PEN dataset presents a challenge for identifying relationships
between tenure and income. Our aim is to control for impor-
tant exogenous factors that may aﬀect both forest income and
our policy variables of interest: enforcement and congruence.
We use factor analysis to describe variability among a number
of observed correlated variables obtained from remote sensing
and GIS data with the aim of producing a lower number of
unobserved variables (i.e., factors) (Table 2). 15 We identify
ﬁve factors that can be clearly interpreted as “forest
domains.” 16 The ﬁrst principal component is strongly associ-
ated with tropical and sub-tropical moist broadleaf forest,
high forest cover, and large distances to roads. For example,
the factor loading on tropical and sub-tropical moist broadleaf
forest is 0.802, and the factor loading on percent of forest cov-
er in 2006 is 0.667, indicating that these variables are strongly
correlated with this factor. The second component is strongly
associated with dry broadleaf forest and high population den-
sity. The third component is strongly correlated with high
rates of deforestation and degradation and high population
density. The fourth and ﬁfth components are strongly associ-
ated with high population densities and, respectively, withmontane grassland and coniferous forest ecosystems. The fac-
tor scores from each of the ﬁve forest domains are used as con-
trol variables in our subsequent analysis. Our factor scores are
robust when considering the full sample of PEN villages.
(b) Forest tenure decomposed
Our ﬁrst research question is focused on the formal forest
ownership categories from which rural households obtain in-
come. As already summarized in Table 1, state tenure domi-
nates the PEN dataset with 69% of the total forest area in
study villages formally owned by the state. Privately owned
forests represent the second most common ownership category
at 18%, and community forests comprise 13%. We decompose
the distribution of forests by enforcement and congruence
characteristics (Table 3). We ﬁnd that only 16% of state forests
are characterized as having no enforcement. The remainder of
state-owned forest is split evenly between moderate and high
enforcement (approximately 40% for each category). The most
straight forward interpretation of moderate vs. high enforce-
ment relates to whether sanctions for rule breaking are some-
times applied (moderate) or always applied (high), but the
severity of sanctions was also a consideration for village-level
focus groups asked to explain the degree of enforcement. The
majority of state forests are characterized as having no con-
gruence (68%). That means that although the state is the for-
mal owner of the forest, the state does not use the forest. An
example is a central forest reserve that is accessed by village
members, but where the state does not actively harvest any
products from the forest. A second example is the case of
the Amazon where smallholders are living on state-owned
land, but due to lack of transfer rights are not forest owners
under the PEN deﬁnition. It is important to note that the ten-
ure data are based upon perceptions of village focus groups.
Their views reﬂect their observations of whether or not the
state is an actual forest user, and is limited to observations
within the geographic sphere of the village and surrounding
areas. The second largest category is cases of full congruence
(23.7%) where the state is both the owner and the sole user
Table 3. Distribution of forest area by tenure characteristics at village-level, percent1,2
State Community Private
Share of
total
Share of state-owned
forest
Share of
total
Share of community-owned
forest
Share of
total
Share of
privately owned forest
All forests 68.9 100 13.2 100 17.8 100
(44.1) (0) (32.5) (0) (35.5) (0)
Level of enforcement
No enforcement 11.8 16.4 1.5 9.3 2.6 11.4
(31.6) (36.6) (11.4) (28.9) (15.1) (30.7)
Moderate enforcement 25.6 39.7 8.5 65.1 12.9 71.4
(41.6) (43.4) (26.8) (47.7) (31.1) (42.9)
High enforcement 31.5 43.8 3.2 25.6 2.2 17.1
(45.6) (49.4) (16.9) (43.8) (12.7) (34.4)
Congruence between formal owners and actual users
No congruence 46.7 68.4 4.5 25.3 1.0 3.4
(47.7) (45.4) (19.9) (42.5) (9.7) (17.8)
Partial congruence 5.8 7.9 1.2 24.1 7.7 37.6
(23.1) (27.0) (9.2) (42.5) (25.4) (45.1)
Complete congruence 16.5 23.7 7.5 50.6 9.0 58.9
(35.4) (41.3) (24.6) (48.7) (24.9) (45.7)
N3 271 199 271 63 271 80
1 Standard deviations in parentheses.
2 Shares are based upon village focus group reports of ownership, enforcement and congruence, and estimates of total area of each forest. Forest-level data
are aggregated to the village-level. State forest area was truncated at 50,000 ha for 16 villages in the sample.
3 Sample sizes for within ownership category indicate number of villages that have forest ownership category present.
S48 WORLD DEVELOPMENTof the forest. We would expect very low smallholder forest in-
comes in cases where village-level focus groups indicated com-
plete congruence for state-owned forests.
A small share of community forest is characterized as
having no enforcement (9%). The most common situation
is moderate enforcement. This is the case for 65% of commu-
nity forests, suggesting that sanctions for rule breaking in
community forests are not always applied, variably applied,
or not very severe. We observe high levels of full congruence
for community forests (51%), suggesting that the property
rights surrounding the use of community forests are limited
to community members or community groups only. How-
ever, there is also a relatively large share of community forest
for which there is no congruence. This means that although
the formal owner of the forest is the community, those
forests are not utilized as community resources. A potential
explanation for this is that the forest has been set aside for
regeneration, meaning that community members do not have
de facto use rights. Or alternatively, as is the case in several
of the Latin American sites, a formal community forest has
been de facto divided up for private use among community
members.
The majority of privately owned forests has moderate
enforcement (71.4%), and a relatively small share of private
forest has no enforcement (11.4%). While one might expect
private forests to be predominantly characterized as having
high enforcement, the dominance of moderate enforcement
might reﬂect that the rules surrounding use of private forests
are clearer and power to exclude is greater, meaning that more
severe or frequent sanctions are not necessary in many set-
tings. However, we speculate that enforcement may vary
depending upon whether subsistence forest products such as
fuel wood and wild foods are being sought as compared with
cash generating forest products such as timber. We ﬁnd that
the majority of private forests (59%) are characterized as
having complete congruence, which means that forest ownersare perceived to be the sole users of their forests. It is note-
worthy that 38% of forests are characterized as having partial
congruence, meaning that other households within the village,
community groups, and even state actors may be accessing
privately owned forests to extract resources. This ﬁnding is
borne out in the household-level data, which show that many
households that do not own forests harvest products from
private forests owned by others.
(c) Tenure and forest income
Total, subsistence, and cash forest income are the dependent
variables in our regression models. We present village-level
averages of adult equivalent adjusted incomes for state, com-
munity- and privately owned forests in Table 4. We ﬁnd that
state-owned forests have by far the largest average incomes
associated with them at approximately US$358 /year. This
value is almost an order of magnitude larger than average
incomes derived from community forests (US$44/year).
Average income from privately owned forest is US$88/year.
These ﬁgures are averages for all villages having this particular
forest tenure system. Given that state forests are more com-
mon, and community forest the least common, the diﬀerences
in average forest income for the full PEN sample are even
larger (see note 4 in Table 4). We also present per hectare
estimates of average household incomes for each formal
ownership category. We ﬁnd approximately the same pattern
of forest income as for the household-level estimates, although
the diﬀerences are smaller (indicating that state forest
areas per household are larger than for the other tenure cate-
gories). Households in our sample obtain most forest income
on a per hectare basis from state forests (US$ 4.55/ha),
followed by private forests (US$ 3.11/ha) and community
forests (US$ 1.32/ha).
We observe some trends in subsistence vs. cash income for
each of the three formal ownership categories. On a per
Table 4. Village-level averages of household absolute and relative forest income1,2,3,4
State-owned forest Community-owned forest Privately owned forest All forests6
Absolute income, USD/adult equivalent
Total forest income 357.89 44.09 87.73 270.55
(772.29) (126.70) (112.82) (632.29)
Subsistence forest income 142.65 22.09 52.62 113.65
(270.29) (54.28) (59.46) (213.07)
Cash forest income 215.16 22.00 35.11 156.84
(580.81) (85.90) (65.57) (447.03)
Absolute income, USD/adult equivalent/ha
Total forest income 4.55 1.32 3.11 2.67
(36.05) (2.76) (5.41) (15.75)
Subsistence forest income 2.49 1.06 1.83 1.56
(24.0) (2.34) (2.80) (10.55)
Cash forest income 2.06 0.25 1.28 1.11
(16.19) (0.84) (3.51) (7.08)
N5 199 63 80 271
1 Standard deviations in parentheses.
2Represents share of total income from unprocessed forest products and harvested inputs (vs. purchased inputs) to processed forest products.
3All between ownership category means (i.e., total forest income from state vs. community; state vs. private; community vs. private) are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 1% level.
4 Figures are for the subset of villages for which forest area data are available (N = 271). For the full set of villages (N = 333) in the PEN dataset we
estimate forest incomes per adult equivalent of US$302 from state forest, US$17 from community forest and US$67 from private forest. Estimated total
forest income (US$386) is lower than US$440 as calculated in Angelsen et al. (2014). Our calculations include income from unprocessed forest products
from natural forests and woodlots/plantations and the value of collected forest products used as inputs to processed products. They do not include forest
income from processed forest products produced with purchased inputs because the tenure status of the forest where purchased inputs were derived is
unknown. Our estimates also exclude income from forest services.
5 Some villages have forests from more than one ownership category. Total number of villages in the sub-sample is 271.
6Average per household and per household/hectare adult equivalent forest income irrespective of formal ownership category.
TENURE AND FOREST INCOME: OBSERVATIONS FROM A GLOBAL STUDY ON FORESTS AND POVERTY S49household basis, we estimate larger amounts of cash forest in-
come derived from state forests (US$215/year vs.US$142/year
for subsistence income), whereas most income from privately
owned forests is based on subsistence products (US$53/year
vs. US$35/year for cash products). The proximity of private
forests relative to state forests may be at play here. In many
cases privately owned forests are nearer to settlements,
suggesting that the collection and transport of generally lower
value subsistence products is more eﬃcient. Higher value
products, including many that are sold for cash income, may
be more prevalent in state-owned forests, and higher returns
may justify traveling longer distances to collect them. Average
incomes from community forests are almost equally split
between subsistence and cash, suggesting that community
forests are used for more than simply providing subsistence
products for marginalized households. When we consider the
split between subsistence and cash income on a per household
per hectare basis, for both state and private forests the split
between subsistence and cash income is roughly 55% and
45% respectively. This is quite diﬀerent than community
forests where 80% of household forest income on a per hectare
basis is for subsistence use. Due to the large standard
deviations observed for state forests, we chose to model the
relationship between forest income and tenure on a per house-
hold, rather than a per hectare basis.
To understand the relationship between tenure and forest
income we investigate enforcement and congruence for each
ownership category for the sub-sample of PEN villages that
have complete data on forest tenure, forest size, and forest do-
main (N = 271) (Table 5). Our dependent variable is the vil-
lage mean of household forest income per adult equivalent.
The policy variables of interest are a series of binary variablesthat indicate the level of enforcement and congruence associ-
ated with the forests in each village. We control for forest size,
forest centered collective action (i.e., number of forest user
groups in village), group characteristics (i.e., village popula-
tion and number of ethnic groups), forest domains,
whether the village has either or both of the other two types
of forests (i.e., for state forests we consider the eﬀect of the
presence of community and privately owned forests), and
region. Regression results are presented by ownership cate-
gory, and for total, subsistence and cash income. In general,
the models explain between 38% and 78% of the variation,
with the highest R2 for the models focused on privately owned
forests.
For state-owned forests, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant
relationship between forest income and moderate enforcement
relative to the base case of no enforcement. This relationship
holds for subsistence income, but is only weakly signiﬁcant
for cash income. These ﬁndings suggest that moderate enforce-
ment, characterized by irregular or moderate sanctions, is
associated with reduced access to forest resources on state for-
ests. The lower level of statistical signiﬁcance for cash income
is surprising. We would expect enforcement eﬀorts to be tar-
geted toward smallholders seeking to utilize state forests for
commercial purposes. However, it may be the case that
enforcement is targeted toward both subsistence and cash in-
come and is more eﬀective for subsistence users, or that users
generating cash income may have better social networks, or
have greater means for paying bribes that persuade enforcers
to look the other way. We note that in the Amazon context
enforcement is not necessarily from state actors, but rather
from the smallholders that occupy state land who
assume enforcement responsibilities. As hypothesized, we ﬁnd
Table 5. OLS results for village-level regressions, dependent variable is village mean of per adult equivalent forest income1,2
State-owned forests Community-owned forests Privately owned forests
Total forest income Subsistence Cash Total forest income Subsistence Cash Total forest income Subsistence Cash
Level of enforcement (c.f. none)
Moderate enforcement 0.726**R 0.690**R 0.624*R 1.335***R 1.081***R 1.273 0.777** 0.637* 0.809
(0.300) (0.307) (0.355) (0.432) (0.345) (0.742) (0.327) (0.302) (0.711)
High enforcement 0.576 0.365 0.754 0.44 0.551 0.088 0.783** 0.801*** 0.701
(0.348) (0.350) (0.590) (0.736) (0.548) (0.845) (0.315) (0.228) (0.693)
Congruence between formal owners and actual
users (c.f. none)
Partial Congruence 0.608*R 0.703*R 0.755 1.485*R 1.486** 0.944 0.153 0.354 0.423
(0.319) (0.356) (0.491) (0.707) (0.561) (0.791) (0.935) (0.722) (1.455)
Full congruence 0.934***R 1.018***R 0.632 0.153 0.041 0.352 0.688 0.669 0.607
(0.312) (0.333) (0.414) (0.559) (0.441) (0.606) (0.951) (0.732) (1.457)
(Ln) Forest size 0.007 0.002 0.123* 0.132 0.156* 0.109 0.316*** 0.288*** 0.308***
(0.067) (0.061) (0.090) (0.108) (0.082) (0.158) (0.076) (0.069) (0.067)
Forest user groups (number of groups) 0.098 0.008 0.328* 0.275 0.259*R 0.247 0.037 0.037 0.018
(0.110) (0.101) (0.165) (0.164) (0.137) (0.173) (0.156) (0.141) (0.210)
(Ln) Number of people in village 0.038 0.05 0.107 0.11 0.094 0.08 0.384 0.365 0.464
(0.091) (0.089) (0.140) (0.158) (0.149) (0.195) (0.256) (0.218) (0.325)
Ethnic diversity (number of groups in village) 0.015 0.022 0.013 0.124*R 0.089*R 0.152**R 0.037 0.025 0.078***R
(0.035) (0.028) (0.042) (0.067) (0.046) (0.069) (0.036) (0.039) (0.020)
Forest domain (factor score)
Factor 1: High quality moist broadleaf forest
in remote regions
0.667***R 0.530***R 0.927***R 1.095**R 1.045***R 0.629 0.109 0.07 0.086
(0.165) (0.169) (0.235) (0.389) (0.324) (0.380) (0.256) (0.258) (0.255)
Factor 2: Dry broadleaf forest in populated regions3 0.081 0.131 0.061 1.232***R 1.133***R 0.927**R – – –
(0.155) (0.172) (0.173) (0.387) (0.275) (0.394)
Factor 3: Low quality forest in populated regions 0.161 0.226** 0.123 0.306 0.518***R 0.038 0.252 0.175 0.213
(0.111) (0.106) (0.154) (0.201) (0.134) (0.211) (0.252) (0.242) (0.270)
Factor 4: Montane grassland in populated regions 0.016 0.123 0.156 0.468 0.155 0.739 0.104 0.158 0.897
(0.134) (0.116) (0.211) (1.07) (0.904) (0.947) (1.224) (1.141) (1.30)
Factor 5: Coniferous forest in populated regions 0.082 0.067 0.360**R 0.007 0.06 0.047 4.429* 3.239 6.524**R
(0.107) (0.106) (0.164) (0.185) (0.140) (0.172) (2.383) (2.510) (2.445)
Presence state forest (0/1) – – – 0.806 0.656 0.875 0.241 0.175 0.219
(0.506) (0.449) (0.558) (0.285) (0.247) (0.303)
Presence community forest (0/1) 0.186 0.174 0.063 – – – 0.058 0.029 0.205
(0.385) (0.343) (0.421) (0.276) (0.251) (0.299)
Presence private forest (0/1) 0.745**R 0.867***R 0.573 0.343 0.255 0.496 – – –
(0.294) (0.293) (0.423) (0.323) (0.278) (0.362)
Region (c.f. Asia)
Latin America 0.131 0.229 0.43 3.743***R 3.458***R 1.814 4.931*** 4.198*** 4.194***
(0.786) (0.821) (1.10) (0.969) (0.591) (1.217) (0.304) (0.299) (0.360)
Africa 0.56 0.316 0.719 1.279 0.931 1.356 1.001* 0.479 2.369***R
(0.576) (0.617) (0.579) (0.891) (0.732) (0.912) (0.532) (0.516) (0.577)
Constant 6.243***R 5.575***R 5.027***R 4.728**R 4.252***R 3.149*R 5.877***R 5.184***R 5.686**R
(0.595) (0.568) (1.00) (1.64) (1.29) (1.661) (1.450) (1.040) (2.550)
N 199 199 199 63 63 63 80 80 80
R2 0.435 0.377 0.410 0.673 0.707 0.521 0.793 0.786 0.691
Log-likelihood (full model) 320.02 299.34 379.33 92.30 81.19 95.42 102.27 95.09 116.40
1 Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the site-level.
2 Coeﬃcient is robust (R) to alternative speciﬁcation that omits forest area data (i.e., same sign and signiﬁcant at 10% level or higher) that includes full sample of villages with tenure data (N = 226 state
forests; N = 63 community forests; N = 88 private forests).
3Omitted from private ownership models due to multicollinearity.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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from state forests and congruence, with the strongest eﬀects
for full congruence. It appears as though use of forests by
the state crowds out use by local forest users, particularly
for subsistence purposes. Congruence has a negative but not
signiﬁcant eﬀect on cash income from state forests.
Ourmodels for income from state-owned forests control for a
number of other variables hypothesized to inﬂuence forest in-
come. The sign on the forest size variable is positive, but is
weakly signiﬁcant only for our regression focused on cash
income from state forests, suggesting that larger state-owned
forests have more potential for cash income generation than
smaller ones. Larger forests are also more remote with large
areas often out of reach from enforcement authorities. We ﬁnd
that the number of forest user groups present in a village is
negatively associated with cash income from forest products,
suggesting that where groups are present, they may not be
focused on activities in state-owned forests, or may not have a
relationship with the state that favors securing beneﬁts for
local resource users. As expected, we ﬁnd strong positive
associations between forest domains that reﬂect high quality
forests and low population density environments (e.g., forest
domain 1) and forest income, and the inverse relationship for
degraded forests with higher population densities (e.g., forest
domain 3). Finally, the presence of privately owned forest is
strongly associated with negative incomes from state forests
for total and subsistence forest income. This result suggests that
private forests may provide a substitute source of forest income.
This ﬁndingmay be related to the proximity of state vs. privately
owned forests in cases where both ownership categories are
present, but may also be related to the relative inﬂuence of
enforcement.
Community forests yield a somewhat diﬀerent picture of
how tenure characteristics inﬂuence forest income. As with
state-owned forests, and relative to the base case of no
enforcement, moderate enforcement is strongly negatively
associated with total and subsistence income from community
forests. High enforcement is positively, but not statistically sig-
niﬁcantly associated with total and subsistence income from
community forests. Relative to the base case of no congruence,
there is a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between forest
income from community forests and partial congruence. This
means that community forests with de facto users that include
private users, the state, and others that do not belong to the de
jure ownership group yield higher incomes those using them.
We ﬁnd that community-owned forests with full congruence
(i.e., community owners are the sole users) have a negative
but not signiﬁcant relationship between full congruence and
forest income.
As with several studies on community forestry and sustain-
able forest management outcomes (Chhatre & Agrawal,
2008; Gibson et al., 2005; Persha et al., 2011), we ﬁnd a
positive association between forest income and the presence
of forest user groups for subsistence forest income. Forest
user groups are often responsible for negotiating very speciﬁc
use rights frequently related to fuel, foods, thatch, and other
products that make up part of the subsistence portfolio of
goods from the forest. We do not identify clear patterns
between other commonly observed indicators of sustainable
forest management for community forests (i.e., forest size,
group size), but do observe a positive and statistically signif-
icant relationship between ethnic diversity and income from
community forests. As was the case for state forests, we ﬁnd
positive and signiﬁcant relationships between high qualityforests and forest income (factor 1); and also ﬁnd the
expected negative and signiﬁcant relationship between forest
income and forests with a high population pressure, espe-
cially for dry broadleaf forests (factor 2). The presence of
state or private forest in a village does not have implications
for income from community forests, suggesting that commu-
nity forests are not substitutes or complements to other
forest ownership categories. Finally, we ﬁnd that relative to
community forests in Asia, community forests in Latin
America have lower incomes. 17
Our results for private forests illustrate that relative to the
base case of no enforcement, both moderate and high
enforcement have a positive inﬂuence on forest income, but
only for total forest income and for subsistence income.
These ﬁndings are opposite (with respect to direction of signs
on coeﬃcients) to what we found for moderate enforcement
of state-owned and community forests. There are at least two
possible explanations for this. One is that privately owned
forests that have no enforcement are of very low quality
and thus have limited potential for generating income. The
second and related explanation is that owners of forests with
income generating potential are managing their forests to
maximize income for themselves and for other members
of the community, particularly for subsistence products.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd similar eﬀects of moderate and high
enforcement for privately owned forests, suggesting that for
this ownership category moderate and high enforcement are
not substantively diﬀerent. We ﬁnd positive signs for total
and subsistence income and from privately-owned forests
and partial congruence, but negative and non-signiﬁcant
signs on all coeﬃcients related to full congruence (i.e., rela-
tive to the base case of none). This may be explained by
the fact that it is common for subsistence products to be
collected from private forests owned by others, for example,
a private forest owner may allow other households in the
village to collect fuel wood, wild foods, etc. from her forest.
In such cases full congruence would have a negative rather
than positive inﬂuence on income.
The other covariates in our models focused on privately
owned forests provide further insights. We ﬁnd positive and
signiﬁcant relationships between income from private forests
and forest size, indicating the importance of scale in our mod-
els for private forest. Cash income from privately owned for-
ests is positively associated with a higher number of ethnic
groups in a village. This ﬁnding echoes our ﬁnding for commu-
nity forests. We do not have a clear explanation for why this
would be the case for privately owned forests. Unlike our
models for state- and community-owned forests, we do not
ﬁnd strong eﬀects of forest domain other than a positive and
signiﬁcant relationship between coniferous forests in popu-
lated regions and cash income from private forests, perhaps
reﬂecting the presence of plantations.4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We set out to describe and analyze the relationship between
forest income and forest tenure characteristics. This is an
important policy question as many contemporary develop-
ment projects and developing country policy reforms are fo-
cused on tenure-related issues including who should own
forests, how strictly property rights should be enforced, and
to what extent use rights should be clariﬁed and limited. We
aimed to ﬁll a perceived knowledge gap by focusing on the
S52 WORLD DEVELOPMENTrelationship between forest tenure characteristics and forest
based livelihoods rather than forest sustainability, which is
the focus of much of the existing literature on forests and ten-
ure. We are also able to leverage the heterogeneity in our data
which includes state-, community- and privately owned forests
in a diversity of research sites throughout the tropics. Using a
common set of variables to operationalize concepts of enforce-
ment and congruence across study sites and forest ownership
categories provides potentially unique insights into the
diﬀerential eﬀects of tenure characteristics, and guidance for
future policy reforms.
Our study has three main ﬁndings. First we ﬁnd that state-
owned forests account for the majority of forest areas (69%)
accessed by rural smallholders in our study sites, with high
forest incomes obtained from state-owned forests relative to
privately owned and community forests. State-owned forests
generate more cash than subsistence income. While privately
owned forests account for slightly more of total forest area
than community forests (18% vs. 13%), they generate more
than twice the income of community forests, with particular
emphasis on subsistence forest products. The lower ratio of
cash to subsistence income from privately owned forests
relative to state-owned and community forests could be due
to distance. Many regularly used subsistence products may
be collected from forests closer to homesteads, which would
seem to favor privately owned forest over the two other
ownership categories. With regard to the diﬀerences in the
overall level of forest income, the low relative income from
community forests could be a reﬂection of the fact that
processes of devolving rights from state-owned forests to com-
munities frequently target low-value and/or degraded forest
areas (Mustalahti & Lund, 2010; Ribot, 2004).
A second ﬁnding is that enforcement matters for forest in-
comes. Yet, in what way depends on the formal ownership cat-
egories and the degree of enforcement. Moderate and high
enforcement are both positively associated with income from
privately owned forests. Conversely, for state-owned and com-
munity forests we ﬁnd a negative association of moderate
enforcement with the local smallholder forest incomes that
we are registering. These ﬁndings coincide with our expecta-
tions for state-owned forests, where enforcement of rules can
prevent access by local people, thereby reducing forest in-
comes. However, we note that in some cases (e.g., PEN sites
in the Amazon), enforcement on state-owned forests is the pur-
view of individuals or community groups protecting their use
rights, meaning that enforcement of rules is not always a top-
down action. Our ﬁndings also support our expectations for
privately owned forests, where we expected enforcement to
combat the degradation of the resource and thereby protect
household beneﬁt streams over time. Our results for commu-
nity forests are somewhat surprising. Though we expected
enforcement to relate to community forests and privately
owned forests in a similar way, the results indicate instead that
the enforcement of rules on community forests yields results
more similar to state-owned forests. That is, enforcement of
rules for community forests appears to restrict access to forests,
thereby reducing incomes. However, community forests may
also be set aside for regeneration, suggesting that some
communities may take a medium-term perspective of forest
management.Our third main ﬁnding is that systems of overlapping users
(i.e., no or partial congruence) are important for maintaining
forest income for smallholders, at least when they are not the
forest owners. Congruence has hence a negative association
with forest incomes from state forests, and a positive association
with incomes from community forests. We ﬁnd, as expected,
that state-owned forests with complete congruence are
associated with lower smallholder forest incomes, suggesting
that tenure reforms that seek to eliminate overlapping claims
to forests, or to limit resource use to the state as formal title
holder to forests, likely will have negative implications for local
people. Resolving contested claims is obviously important, but
overlapping systems of forest rights may alleviate poverty in
some settings. We ﬁnd diﬀerent patterns between congruence
on community forests and forest income. Relative to no
congruence, systems with partial congruence (i.e., owners and
users are partially overlapping sets) are associated with higher
incomes. This ﬁnding supports our earlier assertion that
limiting use rights to formal owners (i.e., full congruence) may
have negative implications for forest income from community
forests.
Our analysis has several limitations. First, our three digit
coding system necessarily simpliﬁes the diversity of forest
tenure characteristics, which in reality are nuanced property
rights bundles, rules, and sanctions. Second, cross-section
nature of our data provides only a snapshot of forest tenures
and income relationships at a given point in time, so we are
unable to capitalize on the dynamic nature of tenure transi-
tions and reforms. Finally, our analysis includes only small-
holder incomes. There may be considerable forest rents
extracted by resident large-scale land holders, absentee large
or small scale land owners, and migrant extractivists. Our
congruence variable describes the relationship between
formal owners and local smallholders, but does not quantify
for the beneﬁts that other groups with overlapping claims
can derive.
This article sets the stage for further research on forest ten-
ure and livelihoods. Our analysis has presented a pan-tropical
overview of the relationship between forest tenure and in-
comes. We propose three directions for future research. First,
more site-level comparative research can zoom in on settings
where state-, community- and privately owned forests exist
in tandem. We ﬁnd evidence of substitution eﬀects between
state and privately owned forests, which could be further ex-
plored to illuminate implications of the global shift in forest
ownership away from the state. At present, much of our
understanding remains based upon studies of community for-
ests and their sustainability. Second, regarding trade-oﬀs and
synergies between forest sustainability and income, we found
that overlapping tenure systems and lower levels of enforce-
ment may beneﬁt rural smallholder. Yet, without longitudinal
data we cannot measure whether over time these higher in-
comes trigger forest resource depletion and sharp reductions
in livelihood contributions Third, our aggregation of data to
village-level averages precluded an examination of the diﬀeren-
tial eﬀect of tenure on female-headed households, ethnic
minorities, and other marginalized groups. Past research on
elite capture of forest resources in the wake of a diversity of
forest policy reforms suggests that the role of tenure in facili-
tating or negating capture also needs to be explored.
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property right is an enforceable claim to a beneﬁt stream (Bromley &
Feeny, 1992). In the context of this paper we are concerned with the
assignment of economic property rights over forest resources and beneﬁt
streams associated with those rights.
2. The relationship between tenure and decentralization is that many
natural resource management decentralization reforms involve the
changing of ownership or changing of property rights structures.
3. The literature on forest tenure generally refers to overlap in rights and
responsibilities. Our data are limited to use rights and should be
interpreted as such.
4. There are no forests identiﬁed as pure open access in our dataset.
Instead, there are three types of formal ownership categories that inﬂuence
who can have access to forested lands: state-, community-, and privately
owned forests. State forests include lands owned and administered
exclusively by governments, and forests that are designated for use by
communities and indigenous people. For example, lands may be set aside
on a semi-permanent but conditional basis as is common in Latin
America. In this context governments retain ownership and entitlement to
extinguish local groups’ rights over entire areas. Community-owned
forests are those where rights to land cannot be unilaterally terminated by
the government without some form of due process or compensation.
Private forests are forests owned by individuals or ﬁrms. In this case,
rights cannot be unilaterally terminated by a government without due
process or compensation. Note that these three categories coincide with
the classiﬁcations used by Sunderlin et al. (2008) and RRI/ITTO (2009),
which allows us to make comparisons to that study.
5. A distinction is made between community and private de facto use
rights. Private use rights refer to situations where only one individual,
household or lineage has the rights to use the resource, while community
rights refer to situations where a more or less well-deﬁned group of people
have the rights.
6. Our analysis includes income from unprocessed and processed forest
products. In cases where inputs to processed forest products were supplied
by the household, such values were included. However, for cases where
inputs were purchased, we do not have data on the type of forests where
these inputs originated. Therefore, such values cannot be included in our
analysis. Our data on source of forests allow us to include approximately
65% of total forest income.7. Forest income is inclusive of income from ﬁshing that was undertaken
in rivers, lakes, or streams located in forests. Our analysis of forest income
does not disaggregate income from forest plantations. Forest income from
plantation accounts for roughly 4.7% of total forest income.
8. The PEN study uses the FAO deﬁnition of a forest. Forests are
contiguous areas of greater than 0.5 hectares, with a tree canopy of greater
than 10%, which are not primarily under agricultural or urban land use,
and where trees can reach a minimum height of 1.5 meters (FAO, 2000).9. Several villages have more than one spatially distinct forest, and/or
multiple forests that all under diﬀerent ownership categories.10. All data used for the factor analysis are at the provincial-scale.
11. Twelve of 20 PEN countries are the same as the 39 RRI/ITTO (2009)
cases. PEN countries cases that are not the same are: Bangladesh;
Ethiopia; Ghana; Guatemala; Malawi; Uganda; Vietnam.
12. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression models
are presented in Appendix A.
13. Our remote sensing and GIS data are missing for China, one PEN
site in Nepal.14. A site is a geographic grouping of villages within an individual PEN
study. For example, the Uganda PEN study includes three sites that are
geographically distinct from one another.
15. We used the principal component factor method, and rotated the ﬁrst
5 ﬁve factors using the orthogonal varimax method.16. Following Kaiser (1960) we retain all factors that have a loading of
greater than 1.00.17. We note that we have classiﬁed some of the Latin American sites with
very high forest incomes (e.g., Pando, Bolivia) as state-owned according to
our deﬁnition of ownership (i.e., who has the right to sell land). However,
these forests under a less strict deﬁnition of ownership (i.e., a deﬁnition
that excludes alienation, but includes access, withdraw, management and
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APPENDIX A. SUUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES USED IN REGRESSION MODELS1,2
Independent variables State-owned forest Community forest Privately owned forest
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range
Moderate enforcement (c.f. none) (0/1) 0.40 0–1 0.63 0–1 0.73 0–1
(0.49) (0.49) (0.45)
High enforcement (c.f. none) (0/1) 0.45 0–1 0.29 0–1 0.21 0–1
(0.50) (0.46) (0.41)
Partial congruence (c.f. none) 0.14 0–1 0.32 0–1 0.25 0–1
(0.35) (0.47) (0.44)
Full congruence (c.f. none) 0.20 0–1 0.44 0–1 0.73 0–1
(0.40) (0.50) (0.45)
Area (hectares) 6,457 0.49–50,000 1,533 0.25–24,585 191.2 0.50–2,967
(13,825) (4,021) (441.7)
Forest user groups in village (number) 0.73 0–5 1.08 0–5 0.69 0–5
(0.83) (1.15) (1.03)
Group size (number of people in village) 1079.61 55–9,000 1,050.35 56–9,132 1,047.52 96–9,000
(1554.50) (1,885.83) (1,703.42)
Ethnic groups (number in village) 3.87 1–30 4.30 1–20 5.58 1–30
(4.38) (4.58) (6.13)
Domain 1: High quality moist broadleaf
forest in remote regions (factor score)
0.09 1.71 to 1.91 0.16 1.62–2.22 0.20 1.62 to 1.40
(0.98) (1.16) (0.92)
Domain 2: Dry broadleaf forest in
populated regions (factor score)
0.05 1.06 to 2.68 0.19 1.13–2.64 – –
(0.99) (0.71)
Domain 3: Low quality forest in populated
regions (factor score)
0.03 1.61 to 5.12 0.25 1.86–5.12 0.39 0.88 to 1.93
(1.13) (1.19) (0.79)
Domain 4: Montane grassland in populated
regions (factor score)
0.07 1.09 to 2.92 0.39 1.24–0.15 0.30 0.66 to 0.13
(1.06) (0.22) (0.19)
Domain 5: Coniferous forest in populated
regions (factor score)
0.07 0.66 to 5.35 0.10 0.54–5.35 0.13 0.36 to 0.14
(1.19) (0.71) (0.10)
State forest in village (0/1) – – 0.37 0–1 0.53 0–1
(0.49) (0.50)
Community forest in village (0/1) 0.11 0–1 – – 0.29 0–1
(0.32) (0.46)
Private forest in village (0/1) 0.21 0–1 0.37 0–1 – –
(0.41) (0.49)
Latin America (c.f. Asia) (0/1) 0.24 0–1 0.32 0–1 0.16 0–1
(0.43) (0.47) (0.37)
Africa (c.f. Asia (0/1) 0.55 0–1 0.57 0–1 0.56 0–1
(0.50) 0.50) (0.50)
N 199 63 80
1 Standard deviations in parentheses.
2 Summary statistics for dependent variables are found in Table 4.
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